Risk as a resource: on the interplay between risks, vaccinations and welfare states in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century Germany by Thießen, Malte
www.ssoar.info
Risk as a resource: on the interplay between risks,
vaccinations and welfare states in nineteenth- and
twentieth-century Germany
Thießen, Malte
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Thießen, M. (2016). Risk as a resource: on the interplay between risks, vaccinations and welfare states in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century Germany. Historical Social Research, 41(1), 70-90. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.41.2016.1.70-90
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46550-2
Historical Social Research 41 (2016) 1, 70-90 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.41.2016.1.70-90 
Risk as a Resource: On the Interplay between Risks, 
Vaccinations and Welfare States in Nineteenth-  
and Twentieth-Century Germany 
Malte Thießen ∗ 
Abstract: »Zum Zusammenspiel von Risiken, Impfungen und Staatlichkeit im 
Deutschland des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts«. Vaccinations protect from infec-
tions, reduce infant mortality, and increase the standard of living. They enable 
a modern risk management. However, vaccinations require a risk management 
also in a very different sense: the danger of side effects and fatal incidents 
questions the benefits of vaccination up to the present day. Therefore, vaccina-
tion programs pose fundamental questions. What weighs more: a risk for the 
common good – or a risk to the individual? The article pursues the history of 
this risk management in Germany, and analyzes the interaction of risk ideas 
and concepts of social order. I focus on communication strategies for vaccina-
tion that came into use in the twentieth century that could not any longer rely 
on coercive measures. They also needed to appeal to the public and resort to 
“risk” as a public argument. The article therefore examines risk discourses with 
which the population should be convinced of the necessity of precautionary 
measures. The main thrust of the article will be that this kind of risk manage-
ment was a prerequisite for a ‘social engineering,’ with which the idea of the 
“preventive self” was raised to the leading figure of modernity since the 1940s. 
Keywords: Vaccination, prevention, precaution, compulsory vaccination, social 
states. 
1.  Introduction 
Vaccinations are modernity’s dreams. They lower health risks, drive out fears 
of epidemics, and help to reduce infant mortality. As a result, immunity against 
life-threatening diseases is a promise and condition of modern life. Today, 
Western societies consider epidemics like diphtheria, polio, smallpox, or tuber-
culosis as menaces of dark times long past. In truth, this condition is quite 
young. While public immunization programs against smallpox were established 
in nineteenth-century Europe, vaccinations against diphtheria and tuberculosis 
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were only introduced in the 1920s and 1930s, and those against polio and mea-
sles even not until the 1950s and 1960s. In this regard, the history of vaccina-
tions is a story about social change in modern ages and a genealogy of security 
and risk concepts until today. 
Risks are challenging. This is not only true in daily life. Moreover, risk con-
cepts pose a challenge for social and historical research. Ulrich Beck’s concept 
of “Risk Society” (Beck 1986, 1992) ignited a debate about risk concepts that 
continues until today (Adam, Beck and van Loon 2000; Mythen 2004; Denney 
2005). The intensity and longevity of these debates also hinge upon the fact 
that it not only revolved around risks as such. Rather, researchers of “risk soci-
ety” expand their argumentation to also include interpretations of modernism 
and postmodernism, the changes of industrial society, and processes of globali-
zation and individualization in the twentieth century. Consequently, new tech-
niques, measures, and interventions not only improved security, welfare, and 
prosperity, but increased and even invented new dangers, threats, and risks of 
modern life.  
Risk society is a fertile field of research for historians, too (see Itzen and 
Müller 2016, in this HSR Special Issue). The fertility of this field of research is 
all the greater if one considers recent research on the history of “endangered 
orders” (Frie and Meier 2014), the history of “securitization” (Conze 2012), or 
the history of provision, precaution, and prevention (Harremoës, et al. 2002; 
Bröckling 2008; Lengwiler and Madarasz 2010; Sarasin 2011; Thießen 2013a), 
who all operate with the risk term. But what insights does a “risk history” pro-
vide? Which findings of the social sciences could historians integrate and build 
upon? In the following, I will highlight three findings of the social science 
debate on risk that also give new impetus to researching risk history. 
First, “risk” is historical. For historians, the historicity of risk concepts may 
seem trivial. In social science research, however, it is not self-evident. Ulrich 
Beck has not least been criticized for not considering the historical back-
grounds of the phenomena he studied enough. Therefore, historian Mitchell 
Dean asked for research on a “genealogy of risk” that should focus on specific 
historical contexts and formations: “It is clear,” according to Dean  
that the genealogy of risk is much more complex than the theory of risk socie-
ty allows. Risk and its techniques are plural and heterogeneous and its signifi-
cance cannot be exhausted by a narrative shift from quantitative calculation of 
risk to the globalization of incalculable risks (Dean 1999, 145).  
A risk history thus should ask for different social and historical contexts of risk 
concepts in order to trace the roots of the “risk society” in the longue durée.  
Second, “risk” is a resource for social change. As Deborah Lupton has pointed 
out, risks cannot only be regarded as threats, but as a chance for social develop-
ment (Lupton 199, 148). “Risk taking,” as Gabe Mythen summarizes this obser-
vation, “can be a socially progressive process” (Mythen 2004, 181). Peter L. 
Bernstein offers an extreme example for this kind of interpretation. He even 
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declares modern risk-management as a foundation of human progress as a whole 
(Bernstein 1996). However, risk concepts also define risky social behavior, “risk 
factors” or “risk groups,” and what is “good” or “bad” for society. “Risk” there-
fore also serves as a resource of standardization, mobilization, or negotiation of 
social norms. A history of risk therefore gains insights into the mentalities of 
societies and into the social and cultural history of politics (Mergel 2002).  
Third, risk-concepts are a resource of legitimation and professionalization. 
In modern times, the management of risks became a technique of the “pension 
and welfare state.” The unpredictable, according to Ulrich Beck, is “designed 
to be predictable, the not-yet-occurred is the subject of current (preventive) 
action” (Beck 2007, 202). Martin Woollacott characterizes the ties between 
prevention and risk management in welfare states as intricately linked. Moreo-
ver, the containment of future dangers has “gradually become the main busi-
ness of government” (Woollacott 1998, 120). In this regard, state legitimacy is 
inseparably tied with risk management. L’État Providence or the “Precaution 
State” (Ewald 1986) proves its expertise in controlling future risks: “To calcu-
late a risk is to master time, to discipline the future. To provide for the future 
does not just mean living from day to day and arming oneself against ill for-
tune, but also mathematizing one’s commitment” (Ewald 1991, 207). 
These three aspects, the historicity of risk concepts, the social functions of 
risk, and the relationship between risk management and welfare states, can and 
should stimulate historical research. They represent the starting point for my 
contribution that focuses on risk concepts as a resource for regulating and mo-
bilizing societies. With examples from Germany between the 1870s and 1970s, 
I analyze vaccination programs as “social engineering.” My focus on Germany 
allows me to analyze the changing of risk concepts in different social systems – 
from the German Empire since 1870 to the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich 
into the Federal Republic. Moreover, such a long-term perspective offers in-
sights into the “prehistory” of what we have been discussing since the 1980s as 
“risk society.” In this respect, my article picks up Dean’s approach to a “gene-
alogy of risk” and extrapolates how social engineers such as politicians, medi-
cal officers of health, or physicians used risk concepts for convincing, mobiliz-
ing, and controlling German society. Before doing so, I will briefly outline the 
relationship between risk concepts, vaccinations, and welfare states. 
2.  Risk and the “Precaution State” – Perspectives of a 
History of Vaccination 
Since the introduction of immunization campaigns in the nineteenth century, 
dreaded diseases such as smallpox, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and polio disap-
peared from daily life – at least in Europe and North America. The vanishing of 
diseases was not just a medical issue, but a cause of national importance, ac-
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cording to historian Peter Baldwin (Baldwin 1999). After all, the triumph of 
vaccination was linked to the emergence of modern welfare states since the late 
nineteenth century. Vaccination programs stood at the top of the agenda of 
health policies. These programs thoroughly changed contemporaries’ ideas 
about the state itself. Debates evolving around health risks, vaccination 
measures, and precaution concepts were not only about life and death, but 
about society as a whole. 
Public negotiations of vaccination focused on two issues, the capability and 
power of the Western welfare state and the rights (and risks) of its inhabitants. 
Vaccination programs, and with them the seeming success in risk management, 
demonstrated and legitimized state power. Plagues may even be called a 
“dream” of those in power, according to Michel Foucault. Disease outbreaks 
gave “the sample to the ideal exercise of disciplinary power.” The state virtual-
ly “dreamed” of the disease, “to make the perfect disciplines work” (Foucault 
1994, 255). In this respect, epidemics were not so much a threat, but an oppor-
tunity for the “precaution state” that emerged in the Western world in the nine-
teenth century. Preventing infectious diseases demonstrated its capacity to take 
action and care for its citizens. The effects of this preventive function can even 
be felt until today. The lower the risk of infectious diseases appears to be for 
us, the more even small outbreaks seem to reveal a failure of the state’s risk 
management ability (Lupton 1993). Scandals about small pox introductions to 
Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, debates about AIDS in the 1980s (see the con-
tribution of Sebastian Haus 2016, in this HSR Special Issue), or the global 
hysteria around swine influenza, avian flu, SARS, and Ebola since the turn of 
the millennium offer some examples of the continuing legitimization function 
of vaccination programs (Schildt 2014; Tümmers 2013, 2014; Lindner 2014). 
Beyond aspects of risk governance, negotiating vaccination programs also 
raised questions on individual risk and rights. Vaccinations not only allowed 
risk management on a collective level. They also required risk management on 
the individual level. In rare cases, vaccinations could and can have side effects 
that might lead to illness or even cause the death of the vaccinated. Vaccina-
tions fueled an individual consideration between risk of illnesses and the risk of 
side effects. 
Both of these dimensions of risk management – the lowering of collective 
health risks by vaccination programs and the individual risk consideration with 
respect to possible side effects of vaccination – have existed in a state of ten-
sion since the nineteenth century. Since the 1870s, this tension divided the 
German society in two groups. On the one side, there was a majority of health 
politicians and medical professionals. For them, the risk for the general public 
and the threat of epidemics weighed more severely than the risk for the indi-
vidual and potential side effects of vaccinations. On the other side, there were 
critics of state immunization programs and compulsory vaccination such as 
anti-vaccinists, supporters of naturopathy, and liberals. They opted for the 
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individual to have the last say in risk management. Managing the risk of dis-
eases and the risk of vaccinations should be matter of the citizen and not of the 
state, according to their opinion. This tension between promoters and critics of 
vaccination governance structures my article covering Germany between 1870 
and 1970. In the following section, I will first examine how German state offi-
cials used collective risks as a resource of social normalization and mobiliza-
tion and for the legitimation of the welfare state. Then, I will investigate the 
handling of individual risks, to which the negotiation of individual rights and 
the “securitization” of the individual body can be traced. 
3.  Collective Risks as Resource of the Precaution State 
3.1  Desires for Risks: Legitimization and Professionalization 
Since the medicalization in Europe during the nineteenth century, precautions 
against epidemics made their way up on the political agenda (Artenstein 2007). 
Vaccinations and containment of infectious diseases were an expression of a 
security promise that the modern state had to keep. Compliance with this prom-
ise seemed to be all the more significant, because at the time modern states 
were pushed in an international competition based on statistical methods. In 
particular the spread or rather the disappearance of infectious diseases seemed 
to relentlessly reveal progress or failure of individual nation states. In this 
context, it is astounding that not so much the disappearance of diseases was 
promoted in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany public, but rather 
the continuous risk of persistent outbreaks: Ominous depictions of health risks 
appear in brochures, promoted leaflets, lectures, newspaper articles, or educa-
tional films. What sense did such risk-representations make that fueled fears in 
the population and questioned the efficiency and legitimacy of the precaution-
ary state? Would it not have been more appropriate to celebrate the withdrawal 
of epidemics as a success story of modernity and the state itself? 
The history of vaccination against smallpox provides us with a first answer 
to this question. In 1874, the German Reichstag approved the Reichsimpfgesetz, 
the Vaccination Law. This law declared, for the very first time, vaccination an 
obligatory measure throughout the whole German empire. Ever since then, all 
Germans were to be vaccinated at the age of one and again at the age of twelve 
against smallpox. The impressive success of compulsory vaccination and the 
successive vanishing of the disease turned out to be equally a blessing and a curse 
for state actors. Smallpox seemed to become a forgotten disease. Already at the 
end of the nineteenth century and just twenty years after introducing the vaccina-
tion act, smallpox was barely mentioned among Germans. “Today,” one physi-
cian wrote in the Hannoverscher Courier in 1893, “the horrors of smallpox 
have fallen almost into oblivion.” Roughly two decades later, Johannes Breger 
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from the Imperial Health Office, the Reichsgesundheitsamt (the predecessor of 
the later Bundesgesundheitsamt, Federal Health Office) even warned of a col-
lective forgetting:  
It is a conspicuous fact that in the memory of the German people, the horror 
and atrocities of the smallpox epidemics of former years actually vanished 
completely. Yet it is only four decades ago that we had to deplore a severe 
smallpox outbreak in the years 1871-72, which has claimed the lives of no less 
than 162,000 people (Breger 1911).  
With the disease of smallpox also public memory about it seemed to disappear.  
It was this fear of forgetting that induced state actors as well as health offi-
cials to conjure up the risk of smallpox from the turn of the nineteenth century 
onwards. Those working in the medical profession in particular saw it as a 
means for establishing self-importance. A brochure from 1907, for instance, 
reminded the German public  
that the dragon of the smallpox threat is only sleeping, but not killed yet. One 
spark thrown into the highly flammable material – the unvaccinated – could 
cause a new fire kindle any time [...]. There is always primary explosive mate-
rial and to ensure there is no lack of sparks, our neighboring countries take 
care of this, who do not enjoy an equal vaccination law as in Germany and for 
whom the saying goes: ‘The most pious cannot remain in peace, when the evil 
neighbors do not like it.’1  
In such leaflets of warnings, the risk of smallpox seemed almost omnipresent. 
Brochures like the above-mentioned, articles, and presentations of doctors 
designed a threatening future that on the one hand was nourished by the vac-
cination fatigue of the Germans, and on the other hand from the negligence of its 
neighboring states. In particular, medical doctors made it their task to keep the 
fear of the risks of smallpox as the “most serious scourge of mankind” alive in 
the Germans. For example, the German Medical Assembly, the Deutscher Ärz-
tetag, made use of the fire metaphor in their appeal for vaccination in 1913 too: 
“The situation here is as with the fire hazard. [...] What use is it for me to build a 
fireproof house [...] if the neighbor acts recklessly with kerosene, fuel wood and 
such. In a fire even the best fire department is no longer of good use.”2 There are 
those interpretations of “Risk as Moral Danger” (Lupton 1993), with which 
medical experts and politicians tried not just to normalize healthy and social 
behavior, but to mobilize the people as well. Vaccination fatigue was stigma-
tized as a risky and improper conduct that increased the social pressure on the 
individual. The emphasis of a permanent risk emanating from careless citizens 
                                                             
1  Bundesarchiv Berlin (in the following: BAB), R 86/1246, Brochure “Zur Jahrhundertfeier der 
Einführung der Schutzpockenimpfung,“ Darmstadt 1907, 22. 
2  BAB, R 1501/111126, Report of the medical officer cologne on the 39th conference of 
“Deutsche Ärztetag“ in Elberfeld, 4 July 1913, 27. 
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and “reckless” neighbors was part of a “normalization” strategy (Link 1997, 
271-3) to impose immunity as a social norm. 
The fact that such norms of social behavior were especially popular among 
doctors highlights another function of risk concepts. They were part of a narra-
tive of the history of professionalization in the medical sector. This is especially 
true for doctors and medical officers. After all, since the introduction of smallpox 
vaccination, they occupied a key role in modern societies. Smallpox vaccination 
and compulsory measures of the Vaccination Law were “the first steps in the 
medicalization of the general public” (Sussman 1977, 575), who at the same time 
founded the reputation of physicians as “experts in questions of health and ill-
ness” (Huerkamp 1983, 630). To them, vaccinations were all the more important 
because other medical measures showed less success. In this respect, conjuring 
risk was in response to a general “trend of skepticism toward expert systems” 
(Myths 2004, 178; Beck 1998, 13) that did not come up only after the 1960s as 
one would expect, but many decades earlier. First, successes of doctors in the 
fight against epidemics appeared more effective in the background of constant 
risks (Bynum 2010, 122). The idea of lasting risks secured and improved the 
social position of the medical profession. 
3.2  Disciplining the Past and the People 
Risk concepts also were a resource of social mobilization. Conjuring lasting 
risks should increase the participation of the population in vaccination pro-
grams. For this reason, official announcements concentrated not so much on 
current improvements but on an uncertain future. Since the presence hardly 
gave cause for concern in epidemiological terms, provisions against future risks 
was a convincing argument for government intervention (Adam and van Loon 
2000, 2). Images of an uncertain future increased the pressure for action on the 
individual that should make the immunization his personal project for the na-
tion body, the Volkskörper. Such forecasts gained even more influence when 
stirring up the past. In a way, health politicians, scientists, and doctors em-
ployed some sort of memory culture and politics of history. In its decision to 
maintain the vaccination act of 1917 the Federal Council, the Bundesrat, for 
example argued with detailed descriptions of past epidemics:  
In previous years, before the vaccination [against smallpox] was widely intro-
duced, thousands of people in the German Reich died annually of this disease; 
many who escaped the smallpox death are distorted by the pockmarks [scars of 
smallpox]. If today, smallpox has become an almost unknown disease in the 
population, this is due to the Vaccination Act that was introduced everywhere.3  
                                                             
3  State Archives Oldenburg, 331-1 I/1334 Bd. 3, Resolution of the Bundesrat on Vaccination 
Act, 22 March 1917, 210-1. 
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Germany’s healthy nation of 1917, the Bundesrat suggested, owed much to 
smart decisions of its past.  
In Germany, such politics of history had two primary functions. On the one 
hand, the contrast between past and present underscored a success story of the 
precaution state. On the other hand, they also counted as evidence that the risk 
for the public had never entirely disappeared. This upheld the pressure to act on 
the individual. Disciplining the past served as a tool of disciplining and mobili-
zation the people. 
3.3  Personalization of Risk Concepts 
Despite all these threatening scenarios, the fear of smallpox among Germans 
sank further in the first half of the twentieth century. According to national 
statistics, vaccination coverage declined, too. At the same time, compulsory 
vaccination against smallpox encountered more and more criticism in the press 
and among politicians. Such developments pointing towards smallpox vaccina-
tion fatigue put many German health officials and physicians on edge. In 1931, 
the Prussian Ministry of People’s Welfare urged that “the German people must 
once again be ravaged by smallpox before it is open again in this sphere to 
reasonable considerations.”4 Against this background, politicians, medical 
officers, and doctors no longer solely emphasized collective risks, but high-
lighted personal risks involved in not following through with smallpox vaccina-
tion programs. Heinrich A. Gins from the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), the 
state research institute for infectious disease, for instance, gave a lurid talk on 
the personal risks of smallpox in 1917. “The condition of the patient at the 
height of the pyoderma,” Gins stated,  
is very bad. Since the pustules on the face lead to a significant inflammation 
of the subcutaneous tissue, there is a strong swelling of the whole face, the 
eyes are swollen and can hardly be opened. Each movement of the mouth is 
painful, because the lips are densely covered with pustules. In order to allevi-
ate this, the anguished patients scratch their skin, thus creating themselves the 
gateway for pus, which then can lead to foul-smelling pus instigation. There-
fore, the room, in which a smallpox patient lies, is filled with the foul smell.  
Contrasting such dire conditions of the non-vaccinated smallpox diseased, Gins 
continues to point out that “the conditions with regards to smallpox cases for 
the ones that have been vaccinated are quite different! The whole disease pat-
tern is blurred and the unmitigated smallpox disease is less similar, the more 
the vaccination protection is still contained” (Gins 1917, 339-40). The deciding 
factor between personal misery or well-being, according to Gins, was solely the 
vaccination.  
                                                             
4  BAB, R 1501/3648, Report of Prussian Medical Committee for Medical Education for Prus-
sian Ministry of People’s Welfare, 20 July 1931, 3. 
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Individual episodes of the illness stood at the center of publications rallying 
for vaccination. They made personal risk very concrete. Since the 1920s, relat-
ed press articles, brochures, leaflets, and even radio broadcasts accumulated 
throughout Germany. One could not only read about the effects of smallpox, as 
in a typical leaflet of a physician in the mid-1920s. Moreover, the leaflet illustrat-
ed the risks for individuals with photographs of smallpox patients that went into 
detail thanks to corresponding explanations. Smallpox was orchestrated as a  
contagious disease that is characterized by a skin rash with high fevers, which 
can be recognized clearly on the pictures. [...] In all severe cases it will cause 
death with violent symptoms, while in milder cases and with a more favoura-
ble starting point, disfigurement by scars of the face and other parts of the 
body, often also resulted in blindness.5  
In such contributions, the personal risk could be felt almost physically. This 
feeling of individual concern was likely to have been the reason for an increase 
of such representations since the 1920s and 1930s. As an argument for vaccina-
tion, personal risks seemed more convincing than the risks for the Volkskörper. 
Surprisingly, the critical discussion of compulsory vaccination and the personali-
zation of risk concepts still continued after 1933. In the Third Reich the legitima-
cy of the compulsory vaccination was even more frequently questioned by state 
actors. Debates about the risk for individuals (see Section 3.1) and the gradual 
loosening of compulsory vaccination helped the general trend of personalization. 
Since the mid-1930s, risk representations, more than ever, aimed at the invoca-
tion of “the preventive self,” which, out of own personal interest, should make 
immunization one’s own responsibility (Thießen 2013b). 
3.4  Fear Management: On the Interplay of Downplaying and 
Emphasizing Risks 
Strategies of normalization, mobilization, and personalization remained en 
vogue, as vaccination campaigns against polio since the 1960s show. In an 
example from Hamburg, risk management as an impulse for mobilization can 
be studied as if examined under a magnifying glass. In September 1960, the 
Hamburger Morgenpost, a local newspaper of Germany’s second biggest city, 
sent out the anxious message that “the number of cases of polio in the city 
continues to increase,” with the result that even “measures such as class clo-
sures” would be discussed. The headline of the article brought these anxieties 
to the point: “Hamburg is in the danger zone.”6 Among health and school au-
thorities, the article aroused a sheer outrage. Particularly indignant was State 
School Inspector Matthewes: “This report is really irresponsible and only in-
                                                             
5  BAB, R 86/4639, Leaflet of Dr. Hillenberg on Smallpox and Vaccination, 1926. 
6  Hamburger Morgenpost, Kinderlähmung: Hamburg noch im Gefahrenbereich, 13 September 
1960. 
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tended to create worries among the parents and in the schools.” Matthewes’ 
fear of worries among the people of Hamburg was well-founded. At that time 
in 1960, the introduction of a new polio vaccine created massive problems in 
the Federal Republic (Lindner 2004). The risk of a polio disease, the Morgen-
post warned of, was thus a real threat, both to the health of the German popula-
tion as well as for state legitimacy.  
Surprisingly, Hamburg authorities were much more receptive towards the 
presentation of health risks two years later. In 1962, all schoolchildren received 
a “Letter to Parents” by the health authorities that described the high risk of 
polio in detail:  
Of all the infectious diseases the most dangerous is the communicable polio 
(poliomyelitis) that is feared particularly because of its unpredictable course. 
Unfortunately, many cases of the disease are very fatal. That is why every po-
lio patient is at risk of lasting infirmity with muscle atrophy of paralyzed 
limbs. Possibly, the patient will also suffer from respiratory paralysis with 
live-long residence in the iron lung [a ventilator], resulting in a kind of help-
lessness that requires constant nursing care. Such a threat weighs heavy on all 
children and young people and, increasingly, also on adults.7  
In order to keep the danger in every readers mind, the word “threatened” 
(bedroht) in this leaflet was not only placed centered, but also put in bold and 
underlined. 
How can we explain this surprising change in communicating health risks? 
Why were warnings about the dangers of polio in 1960 a problem for Hamburg 
authorities while they described the dangers in detail in public in 1962? The 
answer is at hand: In 1962, a state vaccination program was introduced that 
took up the fight against polio. The risk described in the letter to parents was 
none, really, if only one would be immunized, as the leaflet added at the end 
itself: “Nevertheless, the poliomyelitis is not inevitable, because there is a 
preventive measure: the vaccination.” Only at a time when state actors could 
rely on effective preventive measures, the health risks became an argument for 
them in a twofold meaning. On the one hand, it demonstrated the state preven-
tion expertise. On the other hand, it mobilized concerned parents who were to 
take immunization of their children into their own hands. Risk concepts and the 
securitization of polio thus went hand in hand. Moreover, with the decrease of 
polio, highlighting health risks increased as a factor of social mobilization. 
Cass R. Sunstein named this strategy of modern states “fear management”; a 
strategy that intends to make people pay more attention to risks that so far have 
been ignored (Sunstein 2005). 
With “fear management” in mind, one can understand why notorious strate-
gies from the times of the Empire still remained en vogue in the Federal Repub-
                                                             
7  State Archives Hamburg, 361-2 VI, 1312, “Letter to all Parents,“ Leaflet of Public Health 
Service of the City of Hamburg, April 1962. 
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lic, as the further history of polio vaccination shows. When, in the mid-1960s 
in a Parliament debate (of the Bundestag), the CDU deputy Johann Peter Josten 
wanted to honor the success of the vaccination program and pointed out that 
“this disease has been virtually eliminated”; the Federal Ministry of Health 
immediately hit the brakes. States secretary Walter Bargatzky cautioned against 
such optimism and even explicitly questioned in the Bundestag that the “epi-
demic is finally defeated.” He was particularly interested in such “warning,” 
“because [he] want[ed] to avoid that the willingness for voluntary vaccination, 
to which [they] owe[d] this success, somehow could go down.”8 In a nutshell, 
risk concepts were a resource of state health policy, because they increased the 
participation in vaccination and justified government intervention. Health risks 
for public only played a major role if an effective risk management stood 
ready. Precisely because in the 1960s the actual risk of polio sank, the demand 
for publications grew among experts which should have kept a continued risk 
perception among the Germans awake. 
The connection between risk concepts and mobilization becomes obvious 
also in the handling of other diseases throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Despite increasing numbers of disease incidences of typhus 
(Fleckfieber) since the beginning of the Second World War, for instance, offi-
cial publications of the early 1940s downplayed the risk of this disease (Süß 
2002). Such downplaying is easy to understand. After all, the costly vaccine 
production in Germany during the Second World War could at no time keep 
pace with the need for immunizations (Süß 2003, 223-41). Also in the handling 
of rubella, measles, and mumps, the disease risk since 1970s became a public 
issue only once the effective vaccines stood ready. This maneuvering was an 
expression of state risk and anxiety management that David Denney has aptly 
described: “Governments design Risk communication to defuse panic reactions 
within the community, and to build trust and credibility in risk regulations and 
risk analysts” (Denney 2005, 66). 
To what extent fear management obeyed tactical interests can also be ob-
served in a last example: the boom of the influenza topic in the twentieth centu-
ry. Although the “Spanish Influenza” caused between 20 and 50 million deaths 
worldwide in the years 1918-19, German official announcements on influenza 
remained remarkably cautious. Apart from that, this observation is not only 
true for Germany (Michels 2010). Recent research explains the astounding 
restraint in worldwide public relations with the fact that there have been no 
effective precaution and therapy measures since after the First World War. That 
is why this restraint ended in the 1960s. Thanks to the development of new 
vaccines, the awareness for risks now increased in health politics and in public 
(Witte 2014). This change is reflected in a brochure for vaccination of the 
                                                             
8  Minutes of Deutscher Bundestag, 5 May 1965, 9002. 
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German Green Cross, the Deutsches Grünes Kreuz from 1969, which even 
compared the influenza to the plagues and recalled dark former times:  
What a momentous influence on the individual and their family the influenza 
or the flu virus can have, thus proves the fact that under the conditions of the 
present time, an influenza epidemic is quite comparable with the devastating 
epidemics of the Middle Ages.9  
The mutation of influenza to “Mother of all Epidemics” (Taubenberger and 
Morens 2006) and increased attention to the risk of disease as a public threat 
therefore occurred only at a time when vaccines against influenza were available. 
Even though the precaution state drew its legitimacy from the protection of 
the collective Volkskörper since the nineteenth century, a personalization of 
risk has been noticeable since the 1920s and 1930s. On the one hand, every-
thing remained very much the same in the second half of twentieth century. 
The mobilization of the population and the demonstration of state competencies 
were and are still important objectives and obey the public presentation of risks. 
On the other hand, the awareness for the risk of other diseases grew both because 
of the fear management and due to a general securitization. Thanks to new vac-
cination programs in the 1960s, the awareness for risks increased that had so far 
played a minor role. Since the introduction of new immunization campaigns 
against polio, flu, measles, and rubella, all these diseases entered as topics for 
daily conversation for Germans, whose risk perception thus extended.  
4.  Negotiating Individual Risks, Rights and Maturity 
4.1  “Vaccination Damages” as a Political Projection 
It was not just the risks vaccinations reduced but also the risks of vaccination 
that have played a major role since the nineteenth century. For critics of vac-
cination programs, not necessarily the infectious disease represented the threat, 
but rather vaccinations in general and the compulsory vaccination in particular. 
After all, compulsory vaccination justified even state intervention into the 
physical integrity of individuals. This intervention was indeed a health risk, 
because in some cases vaccinations showed side effects and, in rare cases, even 
led to death. Even still, in the mid-1970s, the Federal Health Office (Bun-
desgesundheitsamt, BGA) counted up to 20 children who died every year in the 
Federal Republic from the side effects of smallpox vaccination. In addition, 
there were about 40 or 50 cases of severe “lasting damages” and about two 
hundred further “vaccination damages” that annually were recognized as the 
                                                             
9  Bundesarchiv Koblenz (in the following BAK), BW 24/2090, Report of Deutsches Grünes 
Kreuz, 1969. 
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results of smallpox vaccination (Weise 1974, 4). With the introduction of com-
pulsory smallpox vaccination in the Reichsimpfgesetz of 1874, the individual 
risk was even higher. After all, due to unsanitary conditions during mass vac-
cinations, sometimes diseases like syphilis were transmitted. Side effects were 
debated intensively already during the time of the German Empire. Because of 
this urgent need for discussion, the Reichstag devoted five meetings on the 
compulsory vaccination in the spring of 1874. In a nutshell, the risk of vaccina-
tion raised fundamental questions and split the deputies of the Reichstag into 
two camps. 
Representatives from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Catholic 
Centre Party (Zentrum) were on the one side of the debate. They criticized the 
risk of side effects as a threat to privacy rights. Matthias Merkle, from the 
Zentrum, emphatically described this problem in the parliament: “Gentlemen, a 
truly liberal spirit judges here for freedom, the personal freedom and the free-
dom of the family! Gentlemen, I’m a declared opponent of state omnipotence, 
and this unmistakably occurs in the present law.”10 Even more outspoken was 
Merkle’s party colleague, August Reichensperger. He lined out the individual 
risks of vaccination with an everyday life example: “If you now imagine the 
scene that would occur when a couple of gendarmes [policemen] lead away an 
unfortunate vaccine opponent who will then be operated on by a surgeon with the 
assistance of the armed forces!” In this view, compulsory vaccinations were not 
less than a “more serious interference with the right of personality and the free-
dom of an adult man” and also an expression of a “guardianship of the state.”11 
In the other camp, among the supporters of a compulsory vaccination, such 
objections fell on deaf ears. August Zinn of the Progress Party strongly warned 
the critics of vaccination that “out of sheer respect for personal freedom” the 
public interest of vaccinations should not be overlooked. As the population is 
“educated only in a very inadequate manner” to overlook the health risk state, 
coercive measures were all the more necessary. For representatives of the Pro-
gress and the National Liberal Party, risks for individuals weighed less severely 
than the risk for the general public. This was all the more relevant, because in 
their opinion risks to the general public would increase without compulsory 
vaccination. Since vaccinations do not guarantee absolute protection, each 
“unvaccinated can be regarded as a threat for its environment.” In this view, the 
behavior of the anti-immunization lobby increased the risk for the general 
public and could be considered a “danger to the society.”12 
This early insight into Reichstag debates already suggests that representa-
tives were arguing with the side effect of vaccination on the principles of socie-
ty. The risk for the individual acted as a projection screen where models of 
                                                             
10  Minutes of the German Reichstag, 14 March 1874, 337. 
11  Minutes of the German Reichstag, 3 March 1874, 256-7. 
12  Minutes of the German Reichstag, 6 March 1874, 237. 
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society were designed. In these debates, risk concepts became an argument in 
the dispute over civil rights and the interventionist state. Opponents of compul-
sory vaccination used the individual risk as an argument to scandalize state 
intervention. Proponents of compulsory in turn scandalized the refusal to vac-
cinate as risky behavior that threatens the public (see Section 3). 
4.2  Transnational References for Risk Concepts 
Despite the compulsory vaccination against smallpox was adopted in 1874 by a 
majority of the Reichstag parliamentarians, there were many opportunities for 
such debates in the following years, as well. The risk of compulsory vaccina-
tion was not only discussed in the SPD and in the Center Party. Clubs of vac-
cination opponents also debated compulsory vaccination in order to attempt to 
arouse emotions among the German public. “Who,” for instance, asked a mem-
ber of the anti-vaccination movement from Hannover in 1901,  
could be held responsible for such an intervention into the most sacred rights 
and duties of mothers before the judgment of the Most High? Is this [vaccina-
tion act] meant to be the regulatory protection for freedom provided by the 
Constitution?  
This turned a health issue into a legal issue on state’s rights. 
A “deprivation of freedom” through the compulsory vaccination appeared to 
vaccination opponents to be most scandalous, because in a European comparison, 
it was an exception. In fact, at least the members of the English Parliament had 
decided to abolish compulsory vaccination in the late 1890s. In England, the risk 
of individual side effects have weighed heavier than the risks to the public ever 
since (Hennock 1998; Durbach 2005). At the Weltkongress der Impfgegner 
(World Congress of Anti-Vaccination Movement) in Berlin in 1899, German 
vaccination critics used the English conversion as an opportunity to call for the 
abolition of compulsory vaccination in Germany as well. In a concluding declara-
tion, the participants of the “World Congress” reached the result “that we consider 
the compulsory vaccination in its current form not quite worthy for the new cen-
tury. This has been perceived in England and thus eliminated the compulsion for 
vaccination per se.”13 
The Weimar Republic saw further attendance of the anti-vaccination move-
ment. In the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of members gathered at clubs with 
vaccination critics. They also used international references as an argument to 
scandalize compulsory vaccination. In a brochure, Max von Niessen, a well-
known vaccination critic, pointed to the majority of European states, where the 
risk of individual side effects of compulsory vaccination had already resulted in 
its abolition (von Niessen 1929, 4). Even in parliament, international compari-
sons for dealing with individual risks played a major role. In meetings of the 
                                                             
13  Deutsche Tageszeitung, Die Impffrage, 23 September 1899. 
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Prussian State Health Council (Preußischer Landesgesundheitsrat) or in the 
Imperial Health Office, advocates of compulsory vaccination encountered 
critics like the health politician Alfred Grotjahn (SPD) who considered com-
pulsory vaccination to be “backward.” Comparisons with liberal legislations of 
other countries served Grotjahn as a reference to the right of the individual to 
judge health risks to become a standard of all “civilized nations.” Grotjahn 
demanded appropriate standards for Germany, as well: “What prevents us to do 
it as the English do it?” (Prussian State Health Council 1926, 94). 
4.3  Personalization and Individualization of Risk Concepts 
Just like proponents of compulsory vaccination, its critics equally employed the 
strategy of personalization risk concepts, at least since the 1920s. Until the 
outbreak of World War I, most anti-vaccination movements circulated statistics 
on the total number of vaccine damages in the parliaments. In the Weimar 
Republic, they increasingly used representations of individual fates and even 
photos of the “ones who suffered damages from vaccination” to document 
personal consequences of individual risks. With this kind of personalization, it 
seems that critics of vaccination and supporters of vaccination were closer in 
strategy than they would have liked (see Section 3.3). After all, both sides took 
advantage of the staging of child death to justify their risk concepts: Proponents 
of compulsory vaccination fanned fears of disease with images of sick children 
whereas critics of compulsory vaccination fanned fears of side effects with 
everyday vaccination damages. 
Since the mid-1930s, critique of compulsory vaccination was hardly heard 
any more in the German public. Although many medical officers and NSDAP 
members were critical about the compulsory vaccination, public criticism of 
state measures was regarded as inopportune in the Third Reich. In everyday 
life, however, the criticism that had been cultivated during the Weimar Repub-
lic was quite effective. Since 1935, several derogations were introduced with 
which the compulsory vaccination was gradually eased. Apparently, the indi-
vidual risk of the Volksgenossen in the Nazi state had had quite an impact 
(Thießen 2013b).  
In the Federal Republic, public debates about compulsory vaccination re-
appeared. Following the adoption of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the 
question was whether governmental coercive measures were compatible with 
the fundamental rights now guaranteed by law. Did the government still dare to 
expose its people to the risk of vaccine damage in order to protect the public? 
In 1952, the Federal High Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) provided a clear 
answer to this question:  
The compulsory vaccination orders an interference with the physical integrity 
of individuals in order to keep away damage from them and the people’s en-
tirety of the risk of smallpox. The vaccination of entire ‘Volksgemeinschaften’ 
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[people’s communities] has brought the smallpox epidemics to a standstill in 
many European countries.14  
The BGA assented to this judgement in a clear statement:  
In combatting smallpox it is not about maintaining the health of the individual, 
but to protect the whole population. A judgment on the combat against a dan-
ger to public safety, like the smallpox, cannot be left to the discretion of the 
individual.15  
For state actors in the late 1950s still, the risk for the general public – the po-
tential outbreak of a disease – weighed heavier than individual risks of side 
effects and the interference with the fundamental rights of the citizen. And 
even more important: For the Federal Health Office and the Federal High 
Court, risk management was the domain of the state and not of the individual. 
In their opinion, the population was not capable of considering risk aspects. 
Numerous letters from the German public to the federal and state ministries 
showed that such a paternalistic attitude no longer appeared to date. For example, 
a woman from Hamburg wrote in 1961 to the Federal Ministry of the Interior:  
In the newspaper I read that you criticized the passivity of the population on 
the issue of vaccination. Before one decides to get a vaccination, one does 
have to get clear of the pros and cons […]. One does not simply get vaccinat-
ed just because some authority says ‘Do it.’ I would be very grateful, if you 
would send me appropriate educational material.16 
The desire for an individual risk assessment, for “information” and “maturity” 
found resonance among health policy-makers and medical officers in the 
1960s. In 1966, the newly endowed president of the BGA, Werner Anders, 
raised a fundamental question in a debate about compulsory vaccination:  
What would happen if the compulsory vaccination would be repealed in Ger-
many? I believe it is a question of maturity of the population [...] and that we 
can less by force than by a meaningful education and informing of the popula-
tion, prompt them to overcome this vaccination fatigue.17  
Such considerations highlight a change of risk concepts over the course of the 
1960s and 1970s. With the leave of the planning paradigm, a generation change 
in departments and local boards, but also against the backdrop of a denationali-
zation of public health (Lindner 2004, 221-81), the risks for the general public 
lost the power of persuasion compared to those for the individual. The right for 
an individual “finding balance between different risks” (Bröckling 2008, 40) 
became now a question of responsibility, which demonstrated its limits to the 
                                                             
14  Report of Bundesgerichtshof on vaccination act (VRG 5/51), 25 January 1952, 5. 
15  BAK, B 189/14107, Draft of a Report of BGA on vaccination act, 1957. 
16  BAK, B 142/1897, Letter of a woman of the city of Hamburger to Federal Ministry of Interi-
or, 19 November 1961. 
17  BAK, B 189/14107, Response W. Anders, BGA, at Federal Ministry of Health, 5 August 1966. 
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interventionist state. Ever since, not only the risks that were banned by vac-
cination played a role, but also the risks that were caused by it. 
4.5  Risks in Times of Globalization 
This change since the 1960s was promoted by a threat that was actually not 
new: airplanes. But in terms of public health, airplanes were a nightmare. Until 
then, experts in their fight against infectious diseases had been happy about the 
slowness of ships. Long cruises offered a certain guarantee that diseases broke 
out long before their introduction and could be isolated directly on the ship. 
The increase of air travel in tourism and trade destroyed such safety concepts, 
as the Hessian Ministry of Interior warned in 1956: “Our modern transport, 
which let the global distances shrink to almost nothing, can reintroduce the 
epidemics within a few days, even hours.”18 When smallpox was introduced 
into West Germany for the first time by a tourist in 1959, there was great ex-
citement. The magazine Quick reported for example with a multi-paged exclu-
sive story on the “Smallpox Battle of Heidelberg.” This battle had revealed “an 
alarming threat: In the jet age a long believed dead disease could come back to 
us overnight.”19 
Against this danger, not even those quarantine measures and “vaccination 
wards” helped any longer which were introduced in German airports in the 
1960s. In 1970, Federal Family and Health Minister, Käte Strobel, came to a 
sobering conclusion which laid open the failure of classical precautionary con-
cepts: A control of the travelers “at times of peak traffic could only be carried 
out by sampling.” More successful than quarantine measures and large vaccina-
tion programs seemed to be appeals to the new risk group. Since the mid-
1960s, posters, leaflets, and brochures from governments and healthcare asso-
ciations focused on international travelers. They promoted voluntary vaccina-
tions among the Germans with global threats. This voluntariness included an 
individual risk management. Popular leaflets like “20 Questions – 20 An-
swers,” which were passed out since the 1960s, made potential side effects of 
vaccinations explicitly a topic. They addressed the “responsible” citizen, the 
“preventive self,” who would take their precaution independently and voluntar-
ily into their own hands. 
5.  Conclusion 
Although social research commonly understands “modernity” as the context of 
the risk society, it focuses mainly on developments since the 1970s and 1980s. 
                                                             
18  BAK, B 142/44, Leaflet of Hessian Ministry of Interior, “Den Kopf in den Sand stecken“, 1956. 
19  BAK, B 142/1893, Quick, Seuchen-Alarm für Europa, [n.d., approx. early 1959]. 
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At the center, there are debates around “new social risks” of post-industrial 
societies (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006) on pollution, biotechnology, or risk 
technologies, where the “the shapes of risk society” are outlined (Beck 1991; 
Franklin 1998; Adam, Beck and van Loon 2000). A history of vaccination, 
however, makes clear that both “risk society” and “modernity” could and have 
to be traced back much further. Ever since the nineteenth century the emer-
gence of modern welfare states promoted a constant negotiation of social and 
individual risks. In these debates, as I have shown in this contribution, state 
actors, health officials and the public discussed not only risk in the narrower 
sense, but also the principles of modern society as such: topics concerned pre-
sent diagnoses and future designs, risky and healthy behavior and the relation-
ship between state and citizen. 
In this respect, a historiography of risk society is worthwhile for at least 
three reasons. First, a risk history can historicize current debates. Public de-
bates therefore seem amazingly familiar when it comes to compulsory vaccina-
tion against measles in the US, Great Britain, and Germany since 2013 (Thießen 
2015), or to the side effects of vaccinations, when viewed in historical perspec-
tive. A risk history sketches out traditions and continuities which can be embed-
ded in the risk societies of the 1970s and 1980s. Second, a risk history pays atten-
tion to specific perspectives on changes of risk concepts and their contexts. A 
history of vaccination immunizes us against simple causalities and teleologies to 
which modernity is often shortened. From a historical perspective, it becomes 
apparent that processes of nationalization, bureaucratization, individualization, 
privatization, or liberalization do not inevitably follow turning points or phases 
that are commonly believed. Finally, it becomes visible in historical perspec-
tive how and why risks are constructed. That risks are a social construct has 
reached a consensus in the social sciences. However, historical approaches can 
provide a new empirical basis for these findings. Based on historical sources, 
the construction of risk in government departments, public authorities, and the 
media can be traced among experts and in everyday life. A risk history extrapo-
lates why risks were a resource and still are. It also shows, what past societies 
thought to be “good” or “bad.” In this respect, a risk story wins little insights 
into health risks in the narrower sense. Instead, it gives us insight into transition 
of modern societies from the nineteenth century until today. 
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